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In January 2002, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham recommended Yucca
Mountain in Nye County, Nevada as the country’s central repository for spent nuclear
fuel.  The residents of Nevada, particularly those of the Las Vegas Valley located
approximately 100 miles from the site, have long expressed opposition to the plan,
claiming that the facility poses risks to the health and safety of those living near the
repository.  In spite of the opposition, the Department of Energy (DOE) plans to begin
storing nuclear waste at the site in 2007.
Interestingly, opposition to the site was firm in the 1980s, when many residents
were unlikely ever to be exposed to the risks associated with the site (Kunreuther and
Easterling, 1991).  This suggests that at least some part of the opposition to the site may
be attributable to concern for future generations and the risks they could experience if the
repository were to open.  The concept of bequest value of environmental goods is not
new.  Krutilla (1967) laid the foundation for preservation benefits of environmental
goods including option, bequest, and existence values.  Greenley, Walsh, and Young
(1981) provided the first empirical estimates of these benefits from a case study of
preserving recreation values in the South Platte River Basin in Colorado. Since that time,
very little has been published that contains empirical estimates of bequest value of
environmental goods.
Like Greenley, Walsh, and Young (1981) we are interested in how the present
generation values the uncertain utility of future generations.  Past modeling efforts
support the concept that the appropriate welfare measure under conditions of uncertainty3
is measured from an ex ante perspective.  Early attempts at developing an ex ante welfare
measure relied on the expected utility (EU) model formalized by Von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944) and Graham (1981). When modeling the bequest value of a health
and safety risk, the model must account for the uncertain nature of the externality once
the program is in place.  In addition, when a long-lasting threat is at issue, the temporal
component must be clearly elucidated.  In an effort to account for the episodic nature of
the externality caused by nuclear waste storage, we devise a simple model of
intertemporal choice under uncertainty.  The model allows for the utility of individuals in
this generation to be affected by the consumption of future generations. We present an
estimable form of the model that relies on a few, plausible, assumptions.
Our model also allows us to examine another issue surrounding health-risk
valuation.  Although the expected utility theory predicts rational behavior, there is a
plethora of experimental evidence that the EU model falls short in predicting actual
human behavior. In response, the estimates presented here are based on a slight deviation
from the EU model formalized by Cameron (2001) and Riddel and Shaw (2001).
Specifically, the model departs from the linear-in-risk EU model with the associated
welfare measure, the option price, by including the event variance in addition to the
probability of the event occurring. This produces a quadratic relationship between risk
and what we term quasi-expected utility.  The relationship between our ex ante welfare
measure, termed option wealth (OW), and risk matches the peculiar pattern of risk
valuation observed in the experimental setting.  More precisely, including the event
variance reveals that people place a higher marginal value on low-risk events than high-4
risk events because of aversion to the increase in uncertainty surrounding the high-risk
event.
Using responses from a survey that questioned Southern Nevadans about
perceived risk, willingness to accept (WTA), and household characteristics, we estimate
the parameters of the quasi-expected utility model. We find strong evidence of a bequest
motive. In fact, approximately one third of the social cost borne by a household from the
repository can be attributed to costs to future generations. The results support the early
findings of Greenley, Walsh, and Young (1981) that bequest motives may be a significant
component of estimated nonmarket values. However, the nonzero value for the bequest
motive estimated here is inconsistent with past research such as Deacon and Shapiro
(1975) that found no basis for altruism in public-good provision.
The paper is outlined as follows.  Section 2 presents the theoretical model of
bequest value within the expected utility difference framework.  Section 3 discusses the
survey and data used in the modeling effort. Section 4 describes the empirical model and
results.  Section 5 concludes with some implications for environmental policy when
altruistic or bequest motives dominate values.
2. The Model
Assume that individual i’s lifetime utility is a function of their exposure to some
adverse event represented by  i q where  i q equals  i q  when exposure occurs and zero when
it does not occur. The lifetime probability of individual i being exposed to the adverse
event is equal to π .  Similarly, individual j’s exposure to the adverse event is represented
by the vector  j q and also occurs with probability π . Let  Arepresent the lifetime payment
necessary to compensate an individual for bearing the risk of  i q , and  F A represent the5
portion of that payment that would be foregone if future generations were protected from
the risk. Define  , Ct A and  , Ft A as the payments, at time t, corresponding to lost own utility
and foregone future payments.  If 
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lifetime payments, after discounting, for a general discounting function. Thus,  F A may be
interpreted as the bequest value associated with nuclear waste storage and  CF AA A =− is
the portion of payment meant to compensate for own lost utility. Finally, define PY  as
permanent income. Then, analogous to Cameron (2001) we posit the indirect random
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then the function is convex to the origin. The OW is defined as the minimum lifetime
payment that an individual would accept prior to the imposition of the policy to bear the
risks of the episodic externality. In other words, OW is the state-independent payment
that maintains expected utility at the level prior to the imposition of the policy. As such, it
is an ex ante welfare measure that reveals the maximum WTA prior to the resolution of
the uncertainty surrounding the episodic externality.6
To allow for estimation, we must choose specific functional forms for the utility
functions.  Assume indirect utility functions with and without storage are 
0(, 0 ) VP Y  and
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Here,  C A and  F A are equal to the WTA arising from losses in own utility and other
utility, respectively.  For simplification we allow  ( ) C fq and  () F fq to be linear in q so that
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Following Cameron (2001), solving for  FC AA +  when 
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Equations 1-6 are presented in terms of bequest motive.  Of course, individuals
may value not only the consumption of future generations, but that of others currently
living.  If we define PY as income rather than permanent income and let  C A and  F A  be
payments for the current period only, then the theoretical model may also be useful in
describing contemporaneous altruism rather than bequest value. For the purposes of this
paper, we confine ourselves to the estimation of bequest value.  However, the model, as
developed, is not limited in this respect.
The formula in (6) offers straight-forward estimation of the expected OW.
Operationally, a survey can elicit the total WTA the policy from an ex ante perspective.
A subsequent query may educe the portion of the payment that compensates for
reductions in own utility from risks faced by future generations.  The following section
describes such a survey.  We question residents of Southern Nevada about the Yucca
Mountain nuclear waste repository to determine their risk perception, option wealth, and
the portion of that option wealth attributable to bequest motives.
3.  Yucca Mountain Application: The Survey and the Data
Residents of Southern Nevada were surveyed because they are most likely to be
affected by health risks from the repository. A random sample of households in Southern
Nevada was selected and telephoned by a trained interviewer.
2 They were asked to
participate in the survey. If they agreed, they were sent a booklet describing the Yucca
Mountain nuclear waste repository and the potential risks and damages that it may pose
to those living in Clark County, Nevada. The damages and risks presented in the booklet
vary with distance from the site. During the initial phone call, a telephone interview was
scheduled for a later, convenient time. With the information booklet in hand, the8
household member was asked to report the risk they thought was associated with the
repository. Risks were presented using a risk ladder (see Carson and Mitchell, 2000; or
Loomis and duVair, 1993). Several different risky events are featured on the risk ladder
giving the number of deaths per 100,000 in the population associated with these events or
activities. Respondents were encouraged to provide either a point estimate or, if more
comfortable, a range for the risks. We assume that those who were able to give a point
estimate of the risk were certain; whereas, those expressing the range for the risk were
doing so to express uncertainty about what risk they would face.
Following the risk assessment, the respondents were told that a program could
develop involving their choice to relocate to a safe distance from the site. Respondents
were told their moving costs would be paid if they chose to move. Respondents were then
offered a federal tax rebate and asked if they would stay at their present location or
relocate in response to the increase in risk to their health and safety from the storage
facility.  If a respondent chooses to relocate they will not face any risk from the
repository, though no compensation is received.  If the compensation offsets an
individual’s lost utility from the increase over the baseline risk, the respondent prefers to
stay and accepts the compensation in lieu of the costs associated with nuclear waste
exposure risk.
The survey collected information regarding income, personal characteristics such
as sex and age, and other factors that may influence risk valuation. A series of questions
were asked to assess the WTA of the respondent concerning transportation and storage of
the nuclear waste. The bid amount was presented as a federal tax rebate for residents near
the facility. This proposed method of payment is reasonable, as the nuclear waste9
program of the federal government required that the host state be compensated (Flynn
and Slovic, 1995), and states can then use these federal dollars to compensate or relocate
households asked to bear additional risks.
3  Also, local politicians, including the ex-
governor of Nevada, have touted the idea of ending resistance to the repository in
exchange for compensation.
With the stated subjective risk in mind, respondents were questioned about their
WTA the repository using the double-bounded format (Hanemann, Loomis, and
Kanninen, 1991). During the first round, the respondents were asked if they would accept
a stated amount of money for bearing the risk from the repository or if they would
relocate to protect themselves from the risk. The amount of money was varied over
respondents according to a pre-arranged bid schedule. If they refused compensation and
chose to move, the bid was stepped up for round 2, and the question was asked again at
the higher-bid amount.  If the answer was yes, a lower bid amount was offered.
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Following the WTA questions aimed at storage, we next asked respondents the following
question:
Still assume that a transportation route has been chosen that cannot cause adverse health
impacts to you or your family.  Suppose that a new technology, transmutation, exists that
will make the radioactive material at Yucca mountain harmless in ___ years.  The
treatment facility will be located at Yucca Mountain.  The technology is very expensive.
Realizing that the technology will not cut health risks currently, but would get rid of them
altogether in the future, would you be willing to accept ________  per year in
compensation for the Yucca Mountain site?  YES ______ NO _______
 IF YES, GO TO A. IF NO GO TO B.
a.  If yes, would you be willing to accept ____ less per year? YES ____NO _____
b.  If no, would you be willing to accept ____  less per year? YES ____NO _____.10
Again, the double-bounded format was used.  The time horizon until
transmutation becomes effective and the bid amount were varied over the respondent.
Of those contacted, 24 percent completed the survey. This response rate is
relatively high for the highly transient Nevada community, reflecting the interest in the
topic.  Nevertheless, the response rate is low compared to other valuation studies. Thus,
we need to carefully compare the demographic profile to that of the larger Clark County
population. Those responding to our survey were slightly more affluent than the
population as a whole. Mean household income in Clark County is  $41,657 compared to
our sample-mean income of $51,100.  And, as in many surveys, the sample was modestly
skewed toward older individuals: 21 percent of Clark County households contain at least
one retiree, and 24 percent of the households sampled contained retirees. Other
demographics features of the sample were similar to those reported by the U.S. Census
Bureau for Clark County.
4. Empirical Model
We estimate the expected value of OW in three steps.  First, individual-specific
risk and the associated parameter variance are estimated for each respondent who
reported uncertainty about the probability of an accident.  Next, these estimates are
combined with reported individual-specific risk values reported by “certain” respondent
and a quasi-expected utility model as in equation (5) is estimated.  Finally, E[OW] is
estimated using the parameters from equation (5) and the formula in (6).
4.1. Modeling Uncertainty about Risk
The empirical model is constructed to align with the theoretical model in (6).
Therefore, to begin, we must estimate the mean subjective risk for uncertain11
respondents.
5  Using the risk ladder, respondents were asked to report either a point
estimate or a range of the risk they felt they would bear from transporting the nuclear
waste along the proposed route.  The respondents were permitted to give estimates that
exceeded the scale provided on the ladder. Although a few respondents (less than 5
percent) reported that the risk either exceeded or fell short of the ladder’s range, the
majority of individuals were able to place the risk somewhere along the ladder.
We assume that the perceived risk is a linear function of  i X , a vector containing
household income and individual specific traits, so that (suppressing the individual i
subscript for ease of exposition)
6:
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Where,  ,, ab and  pt are the lower and upper bounds and point estimate, respectively,
offered by the respondent.  Individual i’s contribution to the log-likelihood function is:
(9) {,} {,} {,} {} ln ln { , } ln { , } ln { , } ln { } ab b b pt LI P a b I P b I Pa I P p t ∞∞ =+ ∞+ −∞+ .
The parameter estimates and standard errors of two competing maximum-
likelihood models are reported in Table I.  The results reveal systematic variation in the
reported subjective-risk measure. Risk perception has a well-defined variation for
different genders; females, on average, report a higher subjective risk than do their male12
counterparts. The finding of more risk aversion for women is supported elsewhere in the
literature (see Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998).  Respondents with health insurance
perceive less danger from the nuclear waste storage facility than those without health
insurance. These findings are similar to those of other risk-perception studies (citation,
Viscusi).
Income influences risk perception quadratically.  Lower-income households
perceive less risk.  However, as income increases towards $81,000, the effect diminishes.
At higher incomes, the risk perception is increasing in income.  Thus, the poorest and
wealthiest households gauge the highest risk from nuclear waste storage, all else equal.
The motivation behind the quadratic relationship is not clear. The model may be fitting
the quadratic relationship because it is overly leveraged by a few high-income households
reporting higher-than-average risk. However, 17 percent of our sample households have
an income over $80,000, a relatively accurate representation of the local income
distribution.  Thus, we accept the quadratic relationship as the preferred functional form.
The estimated risk for uncertain respondents is significantly higher than that for
certain respondents.  The model in Table I predicts a mean average death rate of 733
deaths in 100,000 for uncertain respondents compared to 689 deaths in 100,000 for
certain respondents.  The overall subjective death rate is 710 in 100,000.  This is
thousands of times higher than the death rate of 0.08 in 100,000 reported by the DOE.
The difference in risk perception between the DOE and the general public becomes
critically important with respect to estimating ex ante welfare measures.  Equations 5 and
6 suggest that the level of risk perceived by the respondent plays an important role in13
their ex ante value.  Presumably, increasing risk increases WTA and vice versa.  Thus,
risk perception remains a key policy variable.
 We combine the stated death rate for certain respondent with the death rate
predicted by the model in Table I to form a point estimate for each individual of the
expected death rate.  The next step is to develop a response probability model of
willingness to forego compensation in lieu of future risk reduction.  The following
section presents a model that estimates the amount of option wealth that individual i is
willing to contribute to future risk reduction.
4.2. The Response Probability Function and the Option Wealth Function
The probability that individual i defers compensation is related to income, the
level of perceived risk, the variance of the risk, and individual-specific characteristics that
make some individuals more likely to favor future generations.  These traits include a
self-reported measure of the respondent’s health status, graded from 1 to 5 with 1
representing poor health and 5 representing excellent health, the indicator variable,
FEMALE, and a measure of education, EDUC, that begins at zero for those that didn’t
finish high school, 1 for those who did, and increases by one for each year of education
past high school.
According to equations 5 and 6, the level of perceived risk may also play an
important role in determining risk-based welfare measures. However, past research has
repeatedly shown that people tend to overvalue unlikely and unfamiliar events, whereas
they tend to undervalue familiar and relatively likely events (Viscusi cites here).  For
instance, people are willing to pay large amounts to increase the safety of air travel,
where accidents are rare though hesitant to invest the same amount in auto safety which14
has a much higher death rate. To capture this effect, we include the variance of the risk in
the model. Since the probability of an accident, π , is best described by a Bernoulli
random variable, the variance is equal to 
2 (1 ) B σπ π =− .  We estimate this variance as
2 ˆˆˆ (1 ) Bi i σππ =− , where  ˆi π  is equal to the subjective risk, either reported by the individual
for “certain” respondents or computed using the parameter estimates from Table II for
“uncertain” respondents.
The empirical model that follows was developed by Hanemann, Loomis, and
Kanninen (1991) for estimating welfare measures from double-bounded contingent
valuation data.  Assuming a normal WTA distribution, the response probabilities are
given by:
 (10) 
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offered, and  Iu K and Id A  are the step-up and step-down bids in the follow-up question,
respectively.   The contribution to the log-likelihood function for respondent i is:
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jk I with  j = yes or no and k = yes or no are indicator functions for the response to
the initial and follow-up question, respectively.
4.3.  Empirical Results
Table II reports the results of two maximum-likelihood models corresponding to
two different sets of explanatory variables used in the likelihood function. The model15
results support the hypothesis that some fraction of households will move to protect
themselves from the risks associated with nuclear waste transport. For all models, the
estimate of the coefficient of the income term,  ˆ β , is positive and significant. The
coefficient of the death rate is negative and significant. People that perceive more risk
from nuclear waste storage are, at the margin, less likely to agree to contribute some of
their stated WTA toward mitigating future damages from the Yucca Mountain site.
However, according to equation 6, OW is negatively related to the discounted future risk,
but positively related to lifetime risk associated with the repository. Thus, as perception
of risk increases, so do intergenerational transfers of OW, whereas WTA current risk is
increasing in the subjective-risk measure as expected. The coefficient of variance,
2 ˆˆ ππ − , is negative, supporting a quadratic relationship between expected utility and the
death rate.  The quadratic relationship acts to dampen the responsiveness of the estimated
OW to the changes in the subjective death rate for extreme death rates. As risk becomes
very high, a household’s responsiveness to increasing risk begins to fall off sharply.
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The health of the respondent plays a significant role in determining the share of
OW that should be used for future risk reduction.  Healthier respondents are willing to
transfer less wealth to coming generations. The results also reveal that the age of the
respondent affects intergenerational transfers.  Younger respondents are more likely than
older respondents, at the margin, to agree to intergenerational transfers. Controlling for
risk perception, women are less likely than men to support the transmutation program,
indicating that they are willing to contribute a smaller portion of their OW to protecting
future generations.16
Using equation 6, evaluated at the mean responses for each independent variable,
the estimate of the component of OW attributable to altruistic intergenerational utility is
$10,480. The value of the lifetime storage risk is estimated to be approximately $27,500.
Thus, the intergenerational component is slightly more than one third of the total lifetime
value of storage risk. Other studies have found evidence of altruistic behavior.  Popp
(2001) found evidence of altruism using the results of a 1990 survey of demand for
environmental quality.  Greenley, Walsh, and Young (1981) found positive bequest value
for preserving water quality in the South Platte River Basin, Colorado. However, their
modeling approach is very different from ours. In particular, they do not directly assess
the effects of health risk to future generations in the valuation scheme.  Because of this,
their model deviates quite strongly from the option value models proposed by Graham
(1981) and Cameron (2001). This is the first study, to our knowledge, that estimates the
dollar value of OW derived from future generations’ utility within an EU framework.
5.  Conclusion
This paper presents theoretical and empirical models of bequest value for high-
level nuclear waste storage. The bequest value is framed in terms of the portion of OW
that a household is willing to contribute to protecting future generations from health risks
associated with nuclear waste storage.  We find that respondents are willing to donate
approximately one third of their total OW from a particular project to protecting future
generations.
The finding of positive time-based altruism has important implications for
contingent value estimates.  How much of the benefit assumed to accrue to current
households actually accrues, in the mind of the survey respondent, to future generations17
or other households in the present generation?  Policies formulated to equilibrate costs
and benefits may be very different if those values are delivered at different points in time.
Of course bequest value, rather than current period altruism, is considered here.
Nevertheless, this opens the door to household utility functions that include the utility of
other, contemporaneous, households.  Here, too, environmental policy can be misdirected
if the value has an important spatial component.18
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Table I.  Model of Subjective Fatality Rate:
Dependent Variable Is the Number of Deaths
per 100,000 People
Parameter Estimate Std. err.   Prob.
C 930.50 221.75 0.00
Insurance -118.63 177.72 0.25
Income -7.86 5.27 0.07
Income
2 0.05 0.03 0.08
Female 199.23 106.94 0.03
σ
2 1863.64 287.88 0.00
Table II.  Interval Data Probit Model for the Indirect Utility Difference
Function: Dependent Variable Equals 1 if the Respondent Reports
They Will Defer Some Compensation in Exchange for Future Public Safety
Parameters
Estimates
Model I prob Model II prob
C 1.3937 0.0002 1.3060 0.0007
ln(Y+A)/Y)) 2.1798 0.0000 2.1934 0.0000
ˆ π -0.7722 0.0000 -0.8144 0.0000
Female -0.1651 0.1471 ------- -------
Educ 0.0390 0.0780 0.0437 0.0696
Health -0.1345 0.0712 -0.1312 0.0643
Age -0.0114 0.0021 -0.0114 0.0048
2 ˆˆ ππ − -0.0051 0.0214 -0.0053 0.0177
Log-likelihood -307.721
Endnote￿
1 In other words, the utility function for individual i is:
(,,) (,) () i j own i other j UXqq U Xq U q =+
2 The phone-mail-phone method frequently used in contingent value studies is applied
here to obtain responses to a sample of Nevada residents. While a national sample is ideal
for a study to assess transportation risks for the entire population, getting this large a data
set goes beyond the scope of this study. In the discussion of the results, we remind the
reader that Kunreuther and Easterling (1990) found similar results based on their Nevada
and national samples.  Nevertheless, we note that our inferences are confined to a small
group, perhaps any population of individuals with similar demographic characteristics to
our sample: those who would be faced with transporting nuclear wastes on a route located
near their household.
3 Under the 1987 amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, Nevada was to be
compensated at $10 million per year during the site-characterization phase, and $20
million per year once wastes began to be delivered to the site.
4 We assume that the reader is familiar with the double-bounded procedure. Hanemann,
Loomis, and Kanninen (1991) is the standard reference.
5 Viscusi (1989) proposes that we use the individual’s prior and updated assessments of
risk in a Bayesian approach to risk assessment.  Regardless, only the current estimate is
relevant to the expected utility function.  Thus, acknowledging that people will update
not only the mean, but the variance of their subjective risk and consequently their option
price as future information becomes available, we use their current risk perception in the
model.22
6 The death rate must fall in the interval (0,1).  Therefore, we estimated several models
including a censored tobit model, a beta model like that used by Heckman and Willis
(1977) and the linear probability model. We choose to model deaths, rather than the death
rate, for uncertain respondents assuming death counts are normally distributed. This
approach offers robust parameter estimates and provides for more respondent-specific
variation in the response probability function than do the alternative models.
7 The marginal impact of increasing risk on the probability of transferring a portion of
OW is perversely positive for very high levels of risk.  We do not consider this a fault of
the model, however, because the region where the marginal impact is positive is outside
the range of the reported risks.